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INTRODUCTION
It is important for all schools to teach about religion in order to foster tolerance and peaceful
co-existence among diverse groups, especially in the recent social climate of our country and the
rest of the world. A sufficient educational background might show students that religion is central
to the identity of many people in the world, and possibly worth exploring further than the school
context, in order to give them a better understanding of society as a whole. A solely secular
curriculum is an impoverished education. The Supreme Court has specifically noted, “It might
well be said that one’s education is not complete without a study of comparative religion or the
history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization.” 1 While all of this is true,
it is of equal importance that schools do not cross the Constitutional boundaries set out for the
protection of citizens’ own religious freedoms, and refrain from interfering with students’ free
exercise rights and from unlawfully establishing religious ideals. There is undoubtedly a d elicate
balance to strike; however, with the help of the Supreme Court, that balance seems to have been
found by lower courts everywhere.
In addition to learning about the religious commitments of others, public education that
includes religion in the curriculum can expose students to the existence of religious traditions and
beliefs that they themselves might adopt. The number of people who do not identify with or believe
in any religion at all has dramatically increased over the last several years in the United States. 2
While every American is entitled to their beliefs, whether they entail belief in a religion or adamant
denial of such, it might be true that nonbelief is the result of lack of education or exposure to
religion at an early age. Perhaps if students were given a better understanding of religion at school,
as parents get busier and have less time for practice and discussion of religion with their children,
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they would be better equipped with tools to make an informed decision about their beliefs or
consider more possibilities.
This look at religion in public schools will first include a discussion of the constitutional
framework laid out by the Supreme Court, cases that have led to that framework, and themes that
framework has established. Next, the discussion will move to center around decisions on teaching
the Bible and prayer in public schools and how lower courts have applied the Supreme Court’s
framework in such cases, followed by a discussion of parental claims of constitutional violation
by public schools. Then, there will be a section on religion and science and lastly an analysis of
the framework’s application to the lower court decisions.
SECTION I: CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Supreme Court has established a number of themes regarding the presence of religion
in public school curriculums. One of the most concrete and sweeping themes, seen first in the early
1960s, places a prohibition on prayer or devotional bible reading in public schools.3 The theme of
refraining from these activities touches upon a narrower theme. The narrower theme could be said
to be that allowing prayer or devotional bible reading in schools, even with a permissive exception
for non-participants or objectors, is inherently coercive. 4 Justice Kennedy in particular voices
strong objection to the coercive nature of some exercises of religion schools try to implement,
noting that at a graduation ceremony, for example, prayer chosen by the school principal would
subject students to pressure to either stand or maintain respectful silence during the invocation and
benediction, thereby participating in the exercise of religion, even though the school maintains that
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a graduation ceremony is an optional occasion.
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While the Supreme Court undoubtedly

established a prohibition against devotional religious teaching in public schools, the Court also
insisted that teaching about religion in a secular way is allowed. Teaching about religion in a nondevotional way is compatible with the prohibitions established by the Court.
Another overarching theme created by the Supreme Court in the context of public schools
and religion is that even non-devotional practices that are still the clear promotion of religion are
prohibited. For example, schools cannot, under any circumstance, post the Ten Commandments in
classrooms, as they have an underlying purpose which is plainly religious in nature. 6 The Court
also strictly established a prohibition on the teaching of creation science, even asserting that the
teaching of creation science impermissibly endorses religion by advancing the religious belief that
a supernatural being created humankind.7
The Supreme Court also created an unmistakable theme in favor of the protection of
student-initiated religious speech. The Court made clear that forbidding students to meet within
the school’s forum on the basis of religion amounted to impermissible discrimination. 8 The
school’s forum was a limited one created by the existence of various clubs, and religion could not
be excluded therefrom.9 It is important to distinguish, however, the difference between the Court’s
protection of student-initiated religious speech when done privately and in the capacity of a club
setting, and the prohibition on such student-initiated religious speech at a more public event such
as a football game. The distinction stems from the Court’s well-established desire to avoid coercion
of participation in religious exercises for those in attendance at voluntary school functions. 10
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In furtherance of that balance and ensuring the Constitution’s protections are preserved,
the Supreme Court has developed a framework for lower courts to follow in cases of schools and
religious materials. Once a party brings a case to a district court, it will be necessary for the school
or school officials against whom the claims are being brought to prove that there is a secular, nondevotional purpose of the religious teaching in order to prevail. The way this is accomplished is
typically through the Lemon test. Lemon v. Kurtzman11 held that statutes providing for state aid to
or for the benefit of non-public schools were unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment 12 since the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the
statutes involved excessive entanglement between government and religion. Lemon established
that every analysis in the area of the evils the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent, those
being ‘sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity,’13 must begin with consideration of three tests gleaned from the Court’s consideration of
cases addressing such over the years: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; 14
finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”15 Aside
from the Lemon test, the Court has also recognized the endorsement test as a way to determine
whether a government entity’s conduct establishes an impermissible endorsement of religion.
Justice O'Connor first began to articulate the endorsement test as a way to conceptualize Lemon,
and since 1984, both the Lemon and endorsement tests have been widely used by lower courts to
determine whether particular state action constitutes impermissible establishment of religion.16
11

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 43 U.S. 602 (1971).
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; U.S.
Const. amend. I.
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SECTION II: DECISIONS ON TEACHING THE BIBLE AND PRAYER IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
The first Supreme Court case addressing the issue of teaching the Bible and prayer in public
schools was People of State of Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School Dist. No. 71,
Champaign County Ill, et al.17 In McCollum, a resident taxpayer brought an action against the
Board of Education alleging that religious teachers, employed by private religious groups, were
permitted to come weekly into the school buildings during the regular hours set apart for secular
teaching, and then and there for a period of thirty minutes substitute their religious teaching for
the secular education provided under a compulsory education law the state had in place. 18 The
petitioner alleged that this was a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution.19 The Court relied on the principle set forth in the seminal case of Everson v. Bd. of
Education, which provided that the Establishment Clause, properly interpreted, had erected a wall
of separation between Church and State.20 The Court explained that this arrangement by the Board
of Education presented powerful elements of inherent pressure by the school system in the interest
of religious sects.21 McCollum noted the Court’s theme of anti-coercion in the context of public
schools and religion, explaining that even though children are offered an alternative to the religious
course, this does not “not eliminate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to
conscience and outside the school's domain.”22 Thus, the classes were enjoined.23
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People of State of Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign County Ill, et
al., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
18 McCollum, 333 U.S. at 205.
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23 Id. at 231.
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While McCollum involved religious groups teaching in the public schools, Engel v. Vitale
involved the school board itself writing and directing a prayer for students to say.24 In Engel, the
respondent Board of Education directed the school district’s principal to have its prayer said aloud
in each class at the beginning of every school day. 25 Parents of children that attended the school
challenged the constitutionality of the prayer on the ground that it violated the Establishment
Clause.26 The Court held that the state’s program undoubtedly established the religious beliefs
embodied in the prayer at issue because neither the fact that it can be denominationally neutral nor
that observance by students can be “voluntary” are enough to free it from the limitations of the
Establishment Clause.27 The Court explained that violation of the Establishment Clause does not
depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of
laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
nonobserving individuals or not.28 Thus, the prayer was enjoined.29
Another Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of Bible teachings in public schools
was School Dist. Of Abington Tp., PA v. Schempp.30 Abington involved state action that required
each day in public schools to begin with bible reading in two separate cases.31 In case No. 142, the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania required that “At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be
read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day. Any child shall
be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of
his parent or guardian.”32 A family brought an action to enjoin the Bible reading on the grounds
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that it violated their constitutional rights.33 In case No. 119, a city school board adopted a rule that
provided for the holding of opening exercises in the schools of the city, consisting primarily of the
‘reading, without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord's Prayer.’34
Atheist petitioners brought suit. The Court found that the exercises at issue in both cases and the
laws requiring them were in violation of the Establishment Clause because the states were
requiring the selection and reading at the opening of the school day, by the students in unison, and
the exercises were prescribed as part of the curricular activities of students who were required by
law to attend school, and that such opening exercises were religious ceremonies and intended to
be so.35 Like Engel, the Court found that the required exercises were not mitigated by opt-out
provisions available to students since they were part of compulsory education. 36
It is intriguing to follow the case law through the years to see how both state and federal
courts have applied the constitutional framework to real-life scenarios in which these issues have
presented. One of the first curriculum cases decided after the Supreme Court began laying the
framework was Sills v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne.37 Like Abington, the Sills court held statutes
that required Bible reading and the Lord’s Prayer in public schools unconstitutional.38
There are several cases that came shortly after Abington but before Lemon that applied the
Supreme Court’s constitutional framework. The next was State Bd. of Ed. v. Board of Ed. of
Netcong. This case was decided prior to Lemon as well, and thus the test was not applied. In
Netcong, the Board of Education of a public school had issued a resolution stating that
“Superintendent of Schools be authorized, empowered and directed to implement the resolution
33

Id.
Id. at 211.
35 Id. at 223.
36 Id. at 210.
37 Sills v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne, 200 A.2d 615 (N.J. Super. 1964).
38 Id. at 615 (internal citations omitted).
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creating a period for the free exercise of religion in whatever manner, in the exercise of his
discretion, he considers best under the circumstances.”39 Following the implementation of the
resolution, students who arrived at school at 7:55 a.m. (immediately prior to the opening of school)
would utilize the bleachers and listen to a student volunteer read the ‘remarks' (so described by
defendants) of the chaplain from the Congressional Record, giving the date, volume, number and
body whose proceedings are being read.”40 The material was of a purely ministerial nature, and
students were asked to meditate shortly after the reading either about the material or a topic of
their choice.41 Shortly after implementation, the Board sought to continue the implementation of
the resolution, despite the recommendation of the Commissioner of the Board to cease and desist
the resolution due to the Attorney General’s finding that it violated the First Amendment.42 The
state subsequently decided to file suit. Instead of the Lemon test, the Court applied something
similar to a balancing approach, suggested by Justice Brennan in Abington, to determine if there
was an establishment of religion, and if so, whether there was interference with free exercise.

43

The approach suggested that prima facie evidence of aid in establishment might be overcome by
proof that the purpose of the aid was to protect free exercise. 44
The New Jersey Supreme Court explained that the meditation itself was not an issue, but
the fact that the meditation occurred so closely and basically as part of the prayer prevented the
two from being evaluated separately.45 The Court also pointed out that if the resolution were not
an exercise of religion as the defendants insisted, then students should not have been allowed to
excuse themselves from such important a part of the educational process; permissive
39

Id. at 23.
Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 State Bd. of Ed. v. Board of Ed. of Netcong, 262 A.2d 21, 26 (Ch. Div. 1970).
44 Netcong, 262 A.2d 21 at 29.
45 Id. at 26 (internal citations omitted).
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nonattendance in a vital school program is not consistent with secularity. 46 The Court cited a
proposition which was restated in McCollum, which said that once a student is excluded from any
exercise for any reason, particularly one that involves the Bible which others are taught to revere,
they are excluded from groups of students and are subject to reproach and insult. 47 This echoes the
fear of coercion stated in the Supreme Court precedent as well. It was ultimately found that the
cease and desist of the resolution had no adverse free-exercise effect on the rights of the students
who wished to participate, indicating that the balance necessary to allow the religious activity was
not present, and thus the resolution was ultimately held unconstitutional.48
Another pre-Lemon case decided pursuant to the Court’s framework was Vaughn v. Reed.49
In Vaughn, the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia found weekly
religious classes in public schools unconstitutional. 50 The classes were conducted by teachers sent
to school by outside private organizations and purported to teach about religion rather that to
indoctrinate students.51 Students whose parents had not signed cards were excused for study
period.52 One issue for the Court was whether the classes at issue were actually teaching about
religion, or whether they were indoctrinating students. The Court explained that if the course were
being taught within constitutional limits, every student should have been required to attend. 53 The
Court relied on McCollum and Abington in reaching its decision, explaining that in Vaughn as in
McCollum, children who do not take the program are separated from the other members of the
class, and this may have resulted in parents who would not have otherwise enrolled their children
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Id. at 27.
Id. at 30 (internal citations omitted).
48 Id. at 32.
49 Vaughn v. Reed, 313 F. Supp. 431(W.D. Va. 1970).
50 Vaughn, 313 F. Supp. at 434.
51 Id. at 432.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 433.
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in the class doing so.54 One of the Court’s main concerns here was unconstitutional societal
pressures and coercion, which all courts wanted so desperately to be absent in public schools. 55
Lemon is the predominant test regarding religion in public schools. The first two prongs of
the Lemon test, that a law must have a legitimate secular purpose, and that it cannot have the
primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion, came straight from the Abington decision.
The Court in Abington explained that the test for whether legislation was permissible would be as
follows: “what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power
as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the
Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion.”56 Lemon added the entanglement prong and created a test with all
three prongs, and became the predominant test.
In the post-Lemon era, in Wiley v. Franklin, a federal district court in Tennessee held that
a Bible study course violated students’ rights to religious freedom by constituting an excessive
entanglement between government and religion. 57 The school board attempted to argue through its
policy statement that the study of the Bible was “in relation to its place in the origin of the republic,
the establishment and development of the public education, the emphasis on individual worth, and
its pervading influences in the country's government, history, and the very fabric of American
society.”58 Originally, students who were enrolled in the courses stayed in the classroom for
instruction while students who were not enrolled were sent to the library and were “omitted from
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any meaningful classroom assignment or supervision” during the course.59 This changed in 197778 when enrollment would occur only upon written request by students’ parents and students who
were not enrolled would remain in the regular classroom under the instruction and supervision of
their regular teacher.60 The federal district court found that the new curriculum’s purpose purported
to be to provide students with a better understanding of “Biblical characters, stories, settings and
events that are often referred to in secular literature, history and social commentary or which
provide themes for some of the better known works of music and art in the Western world ,”61 but
that there could be little doubt but that the motivation of the Bible Study Committee from its
inception was religious.62 Thus, the purpose prong of the Lemon test was not met. While Biblical
interpretation, personal commitment to these beliefs and practices as well as any discussion of the
religious beliefs and practices of students or of their parents, families or others appeared to be
avoided, the Court ultimately held that the courses were unconstitutional. The Court reached its
decision citing propositions from Everson, McCollum, Engel, Epperson and Abington, as well as
applying the Lemon test in its entirety and holding that the classes advanced the Christian faith and
inhibited other faiths, and constituted an excessive entanglement between government and
religion.63
Like Wiley, the case of Crockett v. Sorenson involved a bible course.64 But here, the federal
district court chose not to apply the Lemon test and found a Bible course at issue impermissible.
The Court held the course unconstitutional, while at the same time reiterating the educational value
of teaching about religion. In Crockett, the public school displayed no authority or supervision

59
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Id. at 137.
61 Id. at 141.
62 Id at 150.
63 Id. at 151.
64 Crockett v. Sorenson, 568 F. Supp 1422 (W.D. Va. 1983).
60

12

over the Bible Teaching in Public Schools group, composed of ministers and representatives of
Protestant denominations; children who were not enrolled were impermissibly separated, as in
Vaughn, creating pressure upon students to enroll; and the class consisted of Bible teachings,
prayers, and hymns.

65

The Court, again, noted the Supreme Court foundations established in

McCollum, Engel, and others, to explain that religious instruction, in and of itself, is not permitted
in public schools. The Court then noted the Lemon test, but explained that such a three-prong
analysis did not seem appropriate in this case, and that the only appropriate inquiry was simply
whether the Bible teaching program constituted a forbidden religious exercise (i.e., advances
religion) or a permissible academic program. 66 For the reasons stated above, the Court found in
favor of the former. Thus, the program was enjoined.67
Gibson v. Lee involved a case in which two Bible history courses were at issue. The federal
district court ultimately found the Bible History I curriculum, one of the curriculums at issue,
satisfied the secular purpose prong of Lemon test after modifications of defendant’s counsel were
implemented, but that the Bible History II class addressing resurrection and miracles could not be
taught as secular history.68 In its analysis of Bible History I, the Court cited to the Supreme Court’s
proposition that the Bible has great significance on Western civilization aside from its religious
significance, which cannot be ignored.69 This furthers the notion that a completely secular
education is an impoverished one. On the other hand, the Court also emphasized the Supreme
Court’s vigilance in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary schools
because of the vulnerable and impressionable nature of elementary-aged children.70 The Court
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applied the Lemon test to see if the school had a secular purpose for the course, and made sure that
this purpose was sincere and not a sham.71 It was held that the adoption of a curriculum ostensibly
designed to teach history and not religion met the secular purpose requirement.72 Regarding the
Bible History II class, also at issue, the Court found it difficult to conceive how the account of the
resurrection or of miracles could be taught as secular history, and thus enjoined the school from
teaching the course.73
The case law demonstrates that the courts have consistently approved efforts to teach about
religion as history and literature, but are committed to rejecting those that promote or appear to
promote faith. They are also careful to make sure that public-school children are not subject to
pressures, stigma, or coercion through the implementation of constitutionally violative courses.
SECTION III: PARENTAL CLAIMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION
This section will discuss parental claims of constitutional violation by schools. Courts
apply the Lemon test as well considering its prongs from the perspective of a reasonable observer
in order to determine whether public school uses of certain materials violate constitutional
protections. In some of these cases, the parents also seek an accommodation under the Free
Exercise Clause.
One case with claims under both clauses, Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, involved
an issue surrounding a school board's refusal to remove a book from a sophomore English literature
curriculum based on plaintiffs' religious objections to the book.74 The state action at issue in Grove
was school board policy of academic freedom and refusal to remove from the curriculum a book
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Id. at 1433 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
73 Id. at 1434.
74 Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1532 (9 th Cir. 1985).
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that offends Grove's religious sensibilities. 75 The Court found no violation of the Free Exercise
Clause because the student was assigned an alternate book to read and was given permission to
leave the classroom upon discussion of the offensive text.76 Regarding the Establishment Clause,
the Court explained that it required government neutrality with respect to religion.77 Plaintiffs
claimed that that use of The Learning Tree in an English literature class has a primary effect of
inhibiting their religion, fundamentalist Christianity, and advancing the religion of secular
humanism.78 The Court found no violation of the Establishment Clause. It applied the Lemon test
and held that the use of the book was not a religious activity and that it served a secular educational
function, because the book’s central theme was life, especially racism, from the perspective of a
particular person, and comment on religion in the book was very minimal.79 The Court cited
Abington in explaining that to establish a First Amendment violation, one can show that challenged
state action has a coercive effect that operates against the litigant's practice of his or her religion. 80
Analysis of the second and third prongs of Lemon were thus not necessary, and no Constitutional
violation was found.
Textbooks continued to be the controversial element in Smith v. Board of School Com’rs
of Mobile County, where the Federal Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s inquiry centered
around whether the use of certain home economics, social studies, and history textbooks had a
primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion.81 The claimants in Smith believed that the
forty-four textbooks at issue both advanced a religion and inhibited theistic faiths in violation of
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Id. at 1534.
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78 Grove, 753 F.2d at 1534.
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80 Id. at 1533.
81 Smith v. Board of School Com’rs of Mobile County, 827 F.2d 684 (11 th Cir. 1987).
76

15

the Establishment Clause.82 The district court’s finding that the textbooks had violated the
Constitution was based on the fact that the home economics textbook required students to accept
as true certain tenets of humanistic psychology, and this was a “manifestation of humanism,” and
that the history and social studies textbooks failed to include a sufficient discussion of the role of
religion in history and culture.83 The Eleventh Circuit analyzed whether the use of the books
impermissibly established and furthered the religion of secular humanism. The Court analyzed this
by applying the Lemon test to the facts of the case. The parties agreed that there was no question
of a religious purpose or excessive government entanglement in this case, and the record confirmed
this.84 Ultimately, the Court concluded that none of these books conveyed a message of
governmental approval of secular humanism or governmental disapproval of theism. 85 With
respect to the home economics textbook, the Court found that the message conveyed is one of a
governmental attempt to instill in Alabama public school children such values as independent
thought, tolerance of diverse views, self-respect, maturity, self-reliance and logical decisionmaking, an entirely appropriate secular effect. 86 Regarding the social studies and history books,
the Court found that an objective observer could not conclude from the mere omission of certain
historical facts regarding religion or the absence of a more thorough discussion of its place in
modern American society that the State was conveying a message of approval of the religion of
secular humanism, nor that these omissions themselves discriminated against the very concept of
religion.87
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Smith, 827 F.2d at 689.
Id. at 691.
84 Id. at 690.
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86 Id. at 692.
87 Id. at 693-94.
83

16

Reading material was again at issue in Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ. In this case,
a parent who was a “born again Christian” objected to a reading material that included mention of
mental telepathy, claiming that any teaching of such violated her religious beliefs. 88 The claim was
that forcing the students to read materials which violate their religious beliefs was a violation of
the Free Exercise Clause.89 One of the plaintiffs testified that the books discussed subjects that
were offensive to her religious beliefs, including evolution, “secular humanism”, “futuristic
supernaturalism,” pacifism, magic and false views of death, claiming that these subjects taught
themes such as “Man As God” and other themes of an occult nature.90 The Court referenced the
Supreme Court’s framework to explain that it violates the Establishment Clause to tailor a public
school's curriculum to satisfy the principles or prohibitions of any religion. 91 The framework was
also noted to establish that although balance of the treatment of religion in public schools was the
goal, efforts to achieve that balance desired by any particular group by the addition or deletion of
religious materials would be a forbidden entanglement of a school creating the very establishment
of religion sought to be avoided.92 The Court further explained that the issue of concern was not
what the district court thought to be the fact that materials ‘compelled the plaintiffs to “declare a
belief,” “communicate by word and sign [their] acceptance” of the ideas presented, or make an
“affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind.’93 Rather, it was the governmental coercion either
to do or refrain from doing an act that violated one’s religious beliefs repeatedly referenced in the
framework.94 The Court held that such coercion was not present here. 95
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Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060 (6 th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1061.
90 Id. at 1062.
91 Id. at 1064 (internal citations omitted).
92 Id. (internal citations omitted).
93 Id. at 1066.
94 Id. (internal citations omitted).
95 Id. at 1070.
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In the next case, Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified School Dist., parents sought injunctive
and declaratory relief against teaching aids used for their children that they claimed promoted
witchcraft, or the religion of “Wicca”.96 The school board had reviewed the materials in response
to opposition, but the case still went to litigation.97 The plaintiffs conceded that the text was
adopted for a secular purpose, and thus the first prong of Lemon was not at issue. The second
prong, however, is contested. The Court analyzed this prong from the perspective of a reasonable
person, but considered the more vulnerable age of school-aged children.98 The Court went a step
further so as to cite Lee v. Weisman, which prohibited graduation prayers, explaining that the
Supreme Court has applied an objective standard for public school Establishment Clause
inquiries, rather than considering the effect disputed materials have on one particular student. 99
Citing Grove, the Court went on to conclude that merely reading, discussing or contemplating
witches, their behavior, or witchcraft, which was what was required by the disputed texts, cannot
reasonably be viewed as communicating a message of endorsement. However, the challenged
sections requiring children to participate in “rituals” of casting spells could potentially be
problematic because it could have amounted to the school persuading or compelling a student to
participate in religious exercise, which is exactly what the Supreme Court prohibited in Lee.100
Ultimately, however, the Court explained that “a practice's mere consistency with or coincidental
resemblance to a religious practice does not have the primary effect of advancing religion.”101
Thus, it was determined that a reasonable observer in the position of a school-aged child would
not view the challenged selections as religious rituals endorsing witchcraft, and thus the second

96

Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified School Dist., 27 F.3d 1373, 1377 (9 th Cir. 1994).
Id.
98 Id. at 1378-79 (internal citations omitted).
99 Id. at 1379 (internal citations omitted).
100 Id. (internal citations omitted).
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prong of Lemon was satisfied.102 Regarding the third prong, it was held that there was no excessive
entanglement with religion as plaintiffs argued because the one-time review of the challenged
material by the school board was not an excessive entanglement. 103 Therefore, there was no
constitutional violation.
In contrast to these cases, the next curriculum case we see the constitutional framework
applied to is California Parents for Equalization of Educational Materials v. Nanoon
(CAPEEM).104 In this case, parents brought an action in the Eastern District of California seeking
partial summary judgment on its Establishment Clause claim. 105 The claim was that a textbook
which represented Hinduism in a discriminatory and denigrating manner (1) expressed intent to
model portions of the subject history textbooks after the New Testament; (2) had improper
influence of religious figures in approving the material addressing Christianity and religious
considerations that went into evaluating the suggested edits of the textbooks; (3) treated biblical
narratives as historical facts and biblical events, including miracles, as actual events; and (4)
contained teachers' materials which purportedly emphasized aspects of indoctrination.106
Prior to applying the Lemon test in CAPEEM, the federal district court explained that
alleged violations of the Establishment Clause in the elementary school setting present heightened
concerns for courts due to the coercive pressure present in elementary schools. 107 The court also
mentioned how some of the heightened concern is counteracted by the broad discretion school
boards have in selecting their curriculums, and that the Supreme Court wants courts to get involved

102

Id. at 1381.
Id. at 1384.
104 California Parents for the Equalization of Education Materials v. Noonan, 600 F. Supp.2d 1088, 1095 (E.D. Ca.
2009).
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1116 (internal citations omitted).
103

19

the daily operation of a school system only if basic constitutional values are “directly and sharply
implicate[d].”108
The district court applied the Lemon test and found that the school’s purpose in adopting
the sixth grade history-social science textbooks was patently secular because it was fulfilling its
obligation to adopt instructional materials for California students that are accurate and consistent
with the State's learning objectives.109 Regarding the second prong, and whether the textbooks had
primarily the effect of advancing other religions and inhibiting the Hindu religion, the Court
evaluated this from the perspective of an objective sixth grader because the Supreme Court
generally has not relied on expert testimony to determine whether a school practice reasonably
appears to endorse or inhibit religion.110 The Court concluded that it could not find that the
textbooks conveyed a message of government endorsement or disapproval of a particular
religion.111 As for the third prong of Lemon and whether the school displayed an excessive
entanglement with a particular religion, the Court held that the Plaintiffs’ discussion of history
books that contain some discussion of religion did not create an excessive entanglement with
religion.112 Thus, the Court in CAPEEM found no unconstitutional endorsement of religion. This
case furthers the proposition that the mere teaching about religion does not amount to endorsement,
safeguarding the principle of the necessary presence of religion in public school curriculums.
A challenge to the teaching about Islam came in Wood v. Arnold. The material at issue
contained statements concerning Islamic belief presented as part of a history course, including a
comparative faith statement, which stated that “Most Muslim’s faith is stronger than the average
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Christian” and a worksheet requiring students to fill in the blanks with information comprising the
“Five Pillars” of Islam.113 The Fourth Circuit held that challenged coursework did not violate First
Amendment rights, because they did not impermissibly endorse any religion and did not compel
students to profess any belief.114 The Court came to its conclusion using the Lemon test. Regarding
the first prong, the Court reiterated that the Supreme Court has recognized the secular value of
studying religion on a comparative basis.115 In Wood, the Court pointed out Islam’s core principals
were studied among other things (including politics, culture, geography)116 and thus, Lemon’s first
prong was satisfied.117 The Court also established that the challenged material involved no more
than having the class read, discuss, and think about Islam, did not suggest that a student should
adopt those beliefs as her own, and thus the second prong of the test was satisfied.118 Finally, the
Court determined that the material did not create an excessive entanglement between government
and religion, so as to violate the third prong of Lemon, because it did not involve “the government’s
‘invasive monitoring’ of certain activities in order to prevent religious speech,” or the funding of
religious schools or instruction.119 Thus, since the challenged material satisfied every prong of the
Lemon test, the Court ruled that there was no constitutional violation.
The application of the Lemon test to the above cases evidences that for a court to hold a
piece of legislation unconstitutional, it must bear an unquestionable constitutional violation. The
courts seem adamant about refusing to completely remove religious materials from curriculums,
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as long as they can be found to display useful information about history, culture, and the like, and
do not mirror indoctrination.
SECTION IV: RELIGION AND SCIENCE
The Supreme Court has addressed religious teaching in the science curriculum in several
important cases. The first discussing the issue of religion and science was Epperson v. State of
Ark.120 In Epperson, a public school teacher brought a claim for declaration that Arkansas
antievolution statutes were void.121 The statute prohibited the teaching in Arkansas public schools
and universities of the theory that man evolved from other species of life. 122 The school
administration adopted and prescribed a biology textbook containing a chapter on evolution on the
recommendation of the teachers.123 A teacher faced with the dilemma of whether to teach the
material brought the action. The Court held that the statute violated the Establishment Clause.124
The Court further explained that the law selected “from the body of knowledge a particular
segment which it proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular
religious doctrine.”125 The statutes were therefore struck down.
Another Supreme Court case, Edwards v. Aguillard, also discussed religion and evolution
in public schools.126 In this case, an action was brought challenging the constitutionality of an act,
the Louisiana Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School
Intrusion Act. The Act forbid the teaching of the theory of evolution in public elementary schools
unless accompanied by the teaching of creation science, and did not require the teaching of either
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theory unless the other were taught.127 The theories of evolution and creation science are statutorily
defined as “the scientific evidences for [creation or evolution] and inferences from those scientific
evidences.”128 Louisiana parents, teachers, and religious leaders challenged the act’s
constitutionality.129 The Court held that the act was facially invalid as violative of the
Establishment Clause because it lacked secular purpose. 130 The Court held this because the act did
not further its secular stated purpose of “protecting academic freedom” since it did not enhance
the freedom of teachers to choose what they taught and did not further the goal of ‘teaching all of
the evidence,’ and because it impermissibly endorsed religion by advancing the religious belief
that a supernatural being created humankind.131
These precedents were applied in a lower court decision involving intelligent design. In
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Dist.132 , parents of school-aged children and member of high
school science faculty brought action against school district and school board, challenging
constitutionality of district's policy on teaching of intelligent design in high school biology class,
which required students to hear a statement mentioning intelligent design as an alternative to
Darwin's theory of evolution.133 The Court held that district's policy on the teaching of intelligent
design in a high school biology class, which required students to hear a statement mentioning
intelligent design as an alternative to Darwin's theory of evolution, amounted to an endorsement
of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause, violated the Establishment Clause under the
Lemon test, and violated the freedom of worship provision in Pennsylvania Constitution. 134
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Intelligent design differs from creation science but still holds that a supernatural being designed
humankind and the world.135 Kitzmiller applied a slightly different version of the Supreme Court’s
framework than previously discussed. It first applied the endorsement test, and then proceeded to
apply the Lemon test. The Court discussed how the holding of Epperson constituted a radical
change in the legal landscape that existed at the time when the Court struck down Arkansas’s
statutory provision against the teaching of evolution. 136 The Court also noted the Edwards decision
which resulted in a national prohibition of teaching creation science in public schools.137
Regarding the present issue in Kitzmiller, the Court applied the Lemon test and the endorsement
test in order to determine whether the teaching of intelligent design was constitutional. 138 The
endorsement test has been described as “a gloss on Lemon” that encompasses both the purpose and
effects prongs, and looks at whether an objective observer acquainted with a statute would perceive
it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools. 139 The federal district court followed the
Supreme Court’s lead and used the endorsement test.140
In order to establish whether or not the endorsement test was satisfied, the Court looked at
whether an objective observer, in this case a reasonable, objective adult, would perceive official
support for the religious activity.141 The Court concluded that the religious nature of intelligent
design would be readily apparent to an objective observer, adult or child, thereby violating the
endorsement test.142 This was because it was established through an expert witness at trial, that
intelligent design was not a new scientific argument, but is rather an old religious argument for the
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existence of God.143 Further, the intelligent design movement describes intelligent design as a
religious argument, intelligent design’s religious nature is evident because it involves a
supernatural designer, and intelligent design is a progeny of creationism, which the Supreme Court
and Constitution forbid teaching as science. 144 The Court went on to say that a reasonable,
objective observer would view the disclaimer given by teachers prior to the teaching of intelligent
design as a strong official endorsement of religion because such an observer would “perceive the
text of the disclaimer, ‘enlightened by its context and contemporary legislative history,’ as
conferring a religious concept on “her school's seal of approval.” 145
The Court also held that the defendants in this case presented no convincing evidence that
they were motivated by a valid secular purpose, and that their attempt to try to prove so amounted
to the type of sham specifically prohibited by the Supreme Court. 146 The Court found this because
although the school board tried to assert improving science education as its critical purpose, it
consulted no scientific materials, contacted no scientists or scientific organizations, failed to
consider the advice of the district’s science teachers, and relied solely on legal advice from two
organizations with demonstrably religious, cultural, and legal missions.147 Thus, the first prong of
the Lemon test was not satisfied. Regarding the effect prong, the Court found that the effect of the
school’s adoption of the curriculum including intelligent design was to impose a religious view of
biological origins into the biology course, in violation of the Establishment Clause. 148
SECTION V: ANALYSIS
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In light of the Constitutional framework laid out by the Supreme Court through various
ground-breaking cases, the lower courts have complied and applied it notably well. The lower
courts have drawn parallels between the facts of cases and various Supreme Court decisions, and
gone further to apply the prongs of the Lemon or endorsement tests to the facts of their specific
cases in order to determine whether or not there were violations of the Constitution. I agree with
the way the courts have applied the Supreme Court framework to cases across the country. It seems
that courts have been able to strike a sensible balance between respect of all religions as well as
for parents’ and students’ beliefs, albeit some stronger than others, and the courts have been able
to rule out those cases which contain mostly frivolous arguments or even phobic attitudes towards
certain religions.
The courts’ decisions in Bible readings and public schools reflected the lower courts’
commitments to safeguarding constitutional values. Particularly, I liked how the courts in Netcong
and Vaughn noted that if the practices at issue were in fact not religious and educational as the
defendants insisted, then children would not have been permitted to opt out of so-called
educational process. These decisions evidenced the court’s concerns about children being coerced
to take religious classes out of fear of being stigmatized for opting out. As the courts explained,
this coercion could result from negative attitudes toward students who appear to want to avoid
classes involving materials such as the Bible, which many are taught to revere.
Regarding the various decisions explored that included parental claims of Constitutional
violation, I thought the courts did well at recognizing cases that involved parents that did not want
their children having any exposure whatsoever to religious beliefs that differed f rom theirs, as
seemed to be the case in Wood and some others. The religion and science cases showcased the
relevance of the Lemon test’s purpose prong. It was clear in Kitzmiller that for such topics as
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creation science and intelligent design the government could not articulate any secular purpose for
having them taught in public schools, and the courts would not enable that.
The cases show that mere exposure to religious ideas such as Islam or Christianity differs
from the suggestion of a scientific theory or fact. This is because in the parental claims cases, texts
that mentioned religions were held to have value for topics such as politics, history, geography and
culture, and were not suggestive of any particular religious beliefs as fact, the way that a scientific
theory can be interpreted as unquestionable, especially to school-aged children who tend to be
more impressionable than others. The courts’ consideration of the ages of reasonable observers
when analyzing the parental claims cases furthered the notion that school-aged children were less
likely to look so deeply into exposure to religions, whereas if they are taught something as a
scientific theory, it is easier to mistake this as concrete fact.
On numerous occasions, the courts mentioned the importance of the presence of religion
in public schools. Although it is clear that religion cannot be taught in a devotional manner within
curricular materials, students have many ways to practice their religion before, during, and after
the school day, in a way that involves no interference from government, which is consistent with
free exercise. Martin J. McMahon’s 1992 article explains the difference between certain prayers
during lunch, free time, recess, or activity period.149 The article explained that courts have held
that student prayer in rooms other than regular homeroom or during lunch were permitted if silent
and made during moments of silence set aside for private meditation, while activities such as
saying grace at lunchtime were not permitted. 150
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President Trump’s January 2020 Executive Order safeguarding the right to religious
freedom for students and organizations evidences the continued protection of students’ rights to
practice religion in school.151 The order maintains that to receive Federal funds, public educational
agencies must confirm that their policies do not prevent or interfere with the constitutionallyprotected rights outlined in the guidance. 152 The guidance also provides that students can read
religious texts or pray during recess and other non-instructional periods, organize prayer groups,
and express their religious beliefs in their assignments. 153 While there remains a need for the divide
between Church and State, following the framework laid out by the Supreme Court lower courts
have been able to ensure religious freedom in school without crossing constitutional boundaries.
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